Stewart Brand, during the first Hackers' Conference in 1984, uttered the infamous maxim, "Information wants to be free". The implication was that any attempt to control and limit the free dissemination of knowledge and information would be met with resistance. That was yesterday's news. Today's is that the British government is seeking to tackle the problem of online piracy by passing a law disciplining those wishing to freely share intellectual property that is under copyright protection.
In 2007, Dan Ariely and Kristina Shampan'er, behavioural economists at MIT, published a paper that established the advantage of "free" over "cheap". They offered a group of subjects a choice between two chocolates, Hershey's Kisses for one cent and Lindt truffles for 15c. Three quarters of the subjects chose the truffles. When they repeated the experiment, reducing the price of each chocolate by 1c, the order of preference was reversed: the majority chose the now free Hershey's Kisses. Although the price difference had remained effectively the same (14c), the effect that "free" had on the subjects' behaviour was remarkable. "Free" produces a completely different consumer dynamic to any other price.
Even so, the seductive resonance of getting something for nothing is of secondary importance, as are a number of other points that have been made since the announcement of Peter Mandelson's intentions.
In her article on liberty central, for example, Charlotte Gore rightly argues that enforcement of the bill will be problematic. How, for instance, will it be possible to identify the person making use of file-sharing websites and networks in cases where more than one terminal is connected to a single internet subscription? An even more defiant argument has been that the online community will anyway invent ways to circumvent the proposed bill.
But both miss the point. The legislating authority of a government is exercised on the basis of what ought to be. As such, the symbolic dimension of instituting or strengthening a law can be detached from the possibility of its enforcement without losing its credibility. The government is showing how it should be; whether and how it can work is a different story.
Second, as many studies have shown, those who use sharing networks to download free music, books or movies are more likely to then purchase hard copies, attend conferences or concerts, pay to watch a movie in the theatre, and so on. Many record labels have slowly shifted their business interests towards profit generated from merchandise, live concerts and other events, focusing on selling what no online network can provide: the real-world experience. This point, too, however, is irrelevant. The discussion about whether media conglomerates will come up with ways to survive online piracy is not conducive to an understanding of the problem surrounding it.
The final example of commentary that detracts attention from the real issue is the micro-political concern that the government is pushing an agenda that could prove decisive in the relationship of an impeding Tory government with media mogul Rupert Murdoch.
Murdoch's concerns are, in a way, well-founded. The emancipatory potential of the free disseminationof intellectual property through infinite replication is overwhelming. Unlike private property that is subject to scarcity, supply and demand laws and other rigid determinations, immaterial property poses an explosive threat to our deeply rooted notions of proprietorship.
It is not only because there can be potentially infinite owners of property that the internet redefines our notion of it. It is also that people who participate in the exchange of immaterial works do not treat them as property. When they exchange music, books or movies, they are not merely transferring ownership from themselves to others; they simply do not recognise themselves as owners in the first place.
Under this light, the terms "piracy" and "theft" in their traditional sense do not capture a significant nuance of the activity that takes place online. Both words refer to an act of unlawful appropriation for one's own use and, potentially, profit. On the contrary, however, creating and maintaining a website that serves as a file-sharing platform not only brings no profit but it invariably requires time, effort and, in most cases, the commitment of personal resources. Additionally, downloading a song, a book or a movie does not deprive anyone else, including their "rightful owners", of them.
Also disturbing to some is that online file-sharing induces a sense of equality, collectivity and camaraderie in communities. On a practical level, users of peer-to-peer networks are allowed to download amounts of material that are proportional to their own contribution. But there is also a widespread ethic that considers free access to information and knowledge conducive to a better society. For those that hold these views, financial reward for the creators is only a means to an end.
Of course, we have to acknowledge the real and serious financial compromise that such activities pose for the rightful owners of copyright. A large portion of the fight against copyright violation derives its currency not from the fear of abuse of the works but from the claim that, should these practices be condoned, the financial consequences would render the continuation of intellectual production impossible or, at least, leave it impaired.
Here it is worth remembering the recent financial crisis. The readiness with which breathtakingly large amounts of money were committed to saving banks, when much more modest funds for causes such as the environment or alleviating poverty were denied or postponed, is telling. Could, for instance, the considerable resources that might be allocated to protecting, policing and, ultimately, sanctioning online file-sharing not be used for rendering it less financially damaging for the creative sector?
But the real issue is not, in the end, financial. The serious threat that online file sharing poses is not to the profits of publishers, record labels or film production companies. The fundamental problem that Murdoch and others predict is that capitalist societies cannot tolerate activities that are sustained by and reproduce the more egalitarian notions of proprietorship and collectivity described above. These notions are in such direct conflict with the prevailing ruthlessly individualistic and fiercely competitive models of behaviour that they must, evidently, be stopped.
